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Statement of Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the appellate court by virtue of the provisions
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Statement of Issues Presented for Review
A. The trial court improperly interpreted the lease provision requiring
defendant o provide an HVAC system in "working condition."
B. The trial court failed to credit Plaintiff for cost of repairs to the HVAC
2

which were undertaken by Plaintiff but were the responsibility of defendant.
C. The trial court failed to properly allocate common area maintenance fees.
D. The standard of review is "clearly erroneous." Dayton-Hudson v. Macerich
Real Estate, 751 F. 2d 219 (8th Cir. 1984).
Constitutional Issues
There are no constitutional issues for review
Statement of the Case
This is a declaratory judgment action which was heard without jury to Judge
Timothy A. Hanson of the Third District Court. Judge Hanson ruled against Plaintiff
and in favor of Defendant, and awarded monetary damages to Defendant on its
counterclaim.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1. On December 28, 1993, Appellant signed a shopping center lease for the
use of 17,600 square feet of space at the Meadowbrook Shopping Center located at
4151 South Redwood Road in Salt Lake County, State of Utah and paid a security
deposit of $7,333.33 (lease, §3.1)
2. The term of the lease was for five years commencing April 1, 1994 and rent
was to be paid at an increasing rate over time so that the rental rate doubled from the
first year to the fifth year (lease, §1.1 and §2.1)
3. Appellant was also to pay "a proportional amount of the costs incurred by
Landlord" (lease, §2.2.2) in supervising and administering the common areas of the
3

shopping center; to pay all utilities and other costs of operating the common areas; and
to maintain and repair the common areas.
4. According to the lease, §2.2.2, common areas are parking lots, sidewalks and
landscaped areas of the shopping center.
5. According to the lease, §2.2.2, proportional amount of charges attributable
to a tenant is the ratio of the tenant's share of the total leased space to the common
areas.
6. Article 23.1 of the lease states in pertinent part the following:
23.1 Landlord to provide Premises in "As Is" condition, except that the
HVAC [Heating, Ventilation, Air Conditioning] must be in working
condition. Landlord to warranty HVAC for sixty (60) days.
7. Robert C. Kropf, an officer of The Dinner and Bingo Club, testified as
follows concerning the condition of the HVAC:
Q. Was the heating, air conditioning, HVAC ever in working condition,
in your opinion?
A. No.
Q. When you first entered, took possession of the premises, opened
business in April of 1994, how did the heating and air conditioning
work?
A. Uhm, the north side unit was not working
(Transcript [T], p 91, lines 13-21)
Q. And you say when you first started work there, first opened business,
the north side heating unit and the air conditioner unit didn't work?
A. I am not sure about the air conditioner, but the heater did not work.
Q. Was it fixed?
A. Not until the following year, or the fall of '94.
Q. Did it work then?
A. No.
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Q. Why didn't it work?
A. I mean, we had heat sometimes. We never had control. We couldn't
control the temperature from the thermostats. And we still have that
problem.(emphasis added)
(T,p 92-93, lines 5-16; 25, 1-5)
Q. Tell me, would you set the thermostat at 72 degrees?
A. 72 to 75
Q. And what would happen when it got that temperature?
A. It kicked the air conditioning on.
Q. And would the heating unit go off?
A. The heating unit would go off and the air conditioner would kick on.
When it dropped down the heater would kick on.
Q. So they alternated back and forth?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you ask Mike at A-Advanced to fix that?
A. Yeah, several times. I mean, he come out and tinkered on them
constantly
Q. Okay. And was it ever fixed?
A. No. By the time we had a problem with that it seemed like we
worked on it constantly. And then someone would come out and he'd
work on the compressors, air conditioning of the unit. It is a constant
back and forth of one or the other.
(T., page 93-94, lines 6-25, 1-2)
Q. Let's talk about the spring of 1995.
A. Okay.
Q. And during that winter had the heating unit ever worked properly so
there was constant heat inside the premises?
A. No.
The Court: I don't understand. No, to the question or no, it didn't work?
A. It just-the temperature to regulate it, to keep it at an adequate
temperature we'd have to manually shut the heaters off. You know,
instead of being on an auto, when it got to a temperature it kicks off,
we'd have to shut 'em off when it got to the temperature, otherwise, the
air conditioner would kick on.
(T., p 94, lines 3-17)
8. Without quoting all of Mr. Kropf s testimony, he continued to state that in
the spring of 1995, the south side unit compressor was knocking (T, p 95, lines 7-9);
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that they would have to go to the roof to press a button three or four times a day (T, p
95, lines 14-19); and that when they first spoke with the defendant landlord, the
landlord was going to install new units (T, p 96, line 5)1
9. In June of 1995, Plaintiff had another air conditioning company undertake
major repairs on the units, which then functioned for approximately 30 days and then
failed again (T, p 99). The air conditioning units were never able to keep the premises
at a constant temperature through the summer of 1995 after the major repairs, causing
Plaintiff to receive complaints daily from customers. (T, p 100).
10. The air conditioning units were never in working condition through the
summer of 1995, and through the date of the trial. (T, p 101; p 148, lines 10-21; p 194,
lines 1-25).
11. Defendant's witnesses testified that a HVAC unit was good for ten to
fifteen years (T, p 15, lines 8-12) and that the units on the premises were so old that
parts were no longer made for the units and that they were approximately twenty-five
years old. (T, p 83, lines 1-16)
11. And in spite of the substantial work undertaken on the HVAC, the heating
units did not work either, having the same problem that the air conditioners had during
the entire period of the lease.

*In light of defendant's objection to the introduction of the last statement
regarding installation of new units, the court admitted the statement to show the
intention of the parties only, and not to indicate an interpretation of the lease or rights
under the lease
6

12. Defendant did present testimony of their repairman that he left the HVAC
units in working condition in April, 1994 (T, p 75, lines 19-22), May of 1994 (T, p 76,
lines 16-19) and in October of 1994, (T, p 78, lines 19-23). Interestingly, throughout
the entire period that the units were supposedly working, Defendant paid over $8,000
in repair bills for working on the units no less than a dozen times. (T, p 86, lines 2-6).
13. The assessment of Defendant's witness that the units work is belied by the
fact that Plaintiff substantially testified that the units never (but for 30 days in June of
1995) worked in any acceptable manner from the date of occupancy until the date of
the trial in December of 1996.
14. Plaintiffs witnesses also testified at length concerning their repeated
complaints to Defendant regarding the failure of the HVAC units (T, p 33, lines 4-16;
T, p 38, lines 15-20, and further testified of Defendant's repeated acknowledgment of
the problem. In fact, Defendant tired so of the complaints that all complaints were
referred directly to the repair company. (T, p 193, lines 6-9).
15. Plaintiff s witnesses stated that bids were discussed concerning the
replacement of the HVAC (T, p 40, lines 10-13) but Defendant's witness stated that
they received no proposals to replace the HVAC (T, p 53, lines 16-22).
Summary of Arguments
1. It is the landlord's duty to repair and replace fixtures and structures on the
demised premises which require a substantial investment of funds.
2. The landlord failed to equitably allocate common area maintenance fees to
7

Plaintiff.
3. The court improperly assessed attorney's fees to Plaintiff.

ARGUMENT
1 DUTY OF LANDLORD TO REPAIR
Dinner and Bingo argues that the HVAC is a fixture to the building which is
then the duty and responsibility of the landlord to repair and maintain. Throughout the
trial, evidence was presented that the landlord agreed to participate in paying for the
replacement HVAC, but in reality, the landlord's obligation is not to merely
participate, but to assume complete responsibility for maintaining its fixtures, just as it
is fully responsible for repairing the plumbing, lighting and other similar fixtures. The
following case law supports this contention:
1. Anchor Inn v. Knopman. 246 NW.2d 416 Michigan. 1976^ Plaintiff lessee
restaurant sued defendant to recover cost of replacing an air conditioning unit. The
lease provision stated that the Landlord was responsible for maintaining the HVAC, so
Landlord worked on units, but could not get it working properly. Manager of
restaurant called Landlord many times to have the units repaired, but the restaurant
finally had to get its own repairmen who said that the unit could not be repaired, but
had to be replaced. The restaurant replaced the air conditioning and sought
reimbursement. The court stated:
Where the landlord has covenanted to make repairs and fails to do so, the
8

tenant, after giving reasonable notice to the landlord, may make the
repairs and recover the cost of such repairs from the landlord or he may
deduct the cost from the rent. See, C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant, §369, p
972; §840, p 807, BorochoffProperties v. Creative Printing, 210 S.E.2d
809 (Georgia, 1974). The landlord's duty to maintain in good repair an
air conditioning unit on the leased premises extends to reimbursing the
tenant for monies expended in replacing defective air conditioning
apparatus. Swern v. Momsville, 239 A.2d 302 (Perm, 1968).
In the case, the court found the HVAC was outmoded at the time the premises
were leased, and that the HVAC could not cool the premises sufficient for use as a
large restaurant. The Landlord was required to pay for the cost of replacing the
HVAC unit.
2. Kosena v. Eck. 635 p.2d 1287 (Montana, 1981)

Plaintiff was the successor tenant to a commercial lease with the landlord
defendant. A fire destroyed the premises, and the defendant restored the building.
The parties orally agreed on rent at the rate of $650 per month, but three months after
moving into the restored building, the defendants attempted to raise the rent to $1175
per month.
"Absent an agreement to the contrary, the common law rule is that the
lessor has no duty to repair [Solich v. Hale, 435 P.2d 883 (Montana,
1967)] Here there is an agreement to repair contained in the lease
agreement, and when the landlords elected to repair and restore the
premises, they became bound by this agreement to make the repairs
necessary. . . The landlords failed to do this, and the tenant was
compelled to complete the work. Under the agreement, the landlords are
liable for the costs incurred by the tenant in completing the repairs that
were the landlord's duty to provide." Kosena, supra, at 1293
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3. Dayton-Hudson v. Macerich. 751 F.2d 219 (8th Circ, 1984)
Plaintiff leased a building with a two-ply roof from defendant landlord. Before
and during the tenancy, the roof leaked and landlord would only repair the leaks as
they occurred. Plaintiff then replaced the entire roof with a four ply roof and sued for
declaratory judgment to obtain the cost of the roof replacement from defendant.
The defendant landlord argued that its duty under the lease was to "repair and
maintain in good order and condition, and that "repair" does not mean "replace."
The trial court found that at the time that the roof was replaced, the roof had exceeded
its useful life and could not be maintained other than by a replacement of the roof.
Utah case law also holds that a landlord is under a duty to repair and to
maintain premises in habitable condition.

In the instant case, Plaintiff testified that

many customers complained about the heat, or cold, as the case was, and that they did
lose business because of the irregularity of the heating and cooling. Defendant did not
counter such argument with any testimony that the premises were adequately heated or
cooled, thus, with no contrary evidence, the court should find that the premises, at
least periodically, were uninhabitable.
4. The Utah Supreme Court case of Wolfe v. White, 225 P.2d 729, 119 Utah
183 (1950) concerned the replacement of a roof, and whether the landlord or tenant
was responsible for the cost of such replacement.
Lessee accepted the premises in an "as is" condition, with the provision in the
lease that the lessor would "keep" the premises in good condition and repair. Lessor
10

argued that the phrase "keep" the premises in good condition and repair does not mean
"put" the premises in good condition and repair [similar to the position of the instant
defendant], and appealed a jury verdict in favor of lessee. In commenting on the
landlord's duty, the Wolfe court states:
The premises may be, when leased, so old and dilapidated as to
uninhabitable and to claim that the owner of the premises may, with
the knowledge of their condition lease them for the purpose of a
dwelling house or hotel, for example, with an express covenant on his
part that he will keep them in repair and yet be under no obligation to
put the premises in a habitable condition is contrary both to common law
and to common sense. If the lessor covenants to keep the premises in
repair, he must put them in such a condition that they shall be
reasonably fit for the occupation of the tenant. Id. at 731
The court further comments on the issue of how to determine whether a fixture
is in "working condition" or "good condition" which appear to be comparative terms:
'Good condition and repair' is a relative phrase, but it does
not mean just any condition in which the building may be found.
Apparently neither party actually knew the condition of the roof at the
time of the execution of the lease. Later it was discovered to be
defective. It was out of good condition and repair. Who was to put it
in? If the parties intended to contract that the landlord would
'maintain the roof in its present state', it would have been a simple
matter for them to have so indicated. The lease was drawn by the
landlord, and is to be construed most strongly against him where a
question of conflicting meaning arises. Id. at 731-732

The Landlord does have a duty to repair those items of the demised premises
which are permanent and incapable of being removed or altered without significant
effort and structural change. See, Randolph, The Commercial Property Lease 165
(1993) and Fresh Cut. Inc. v. Bert Fazli. 650 N.E. 2d 1126 (1995V In this case, the
11

HVAC units were structurally attached to the building and were part and parcel of the
structure of the building. As such, defendant was obligated to maintain, repair, and if
necessaiy, as it was in this case, to replace the HVAC units at its cost without any
burden to Plaintiff. See, Paul Mueller Company v. Cache Valley Dairy. 657 P.2d 1279
(Utah, 1982).
II. ALLOCATION OF COMMON AREA MAINTENANCE FEES.
Each tenant of the strip mall where the subject premises are located is required
to pay a proportionate share of the expenses of operating the mall such as maintenance
and repair of the parking lot, utility payments for electric lighting, landscaping and
similar events. The specific language from the lease defines common area
maintenance (CAM) fees as follows:
2.2.2 A proportional amount (as defined below) of the costs incurred by
Landlord to (I) supervise and administer the common areas . . . (ii) pay all
utilities and other costs, taxes, levies and expenses of operating the common
area of the Shopping Center, general signs and the like; and (iii) maintain and
repair all such common areas. . . . shall include a fee to Landlord for
supervision . . . equal to 5% of Tenant's minimum rent.
The "proportional amount" of such charges attributable to Tenant is the
percent derived from dividing the square footage leased by Tenant hereunder by
the total leasable square footage of the Shopping Center.
As stated at the trial, Plaintiff was consistently billed for CAM fees at the
annual rate of $1.50 per square foot of leased space. In such case, Plaintiff paid the
amount of $2,179.65 per month, or $26,156.00 per year for 17.48% of the total
premises. Yet all of the documents produced by defendant indicated that the CAM
fees, along with taxes and insurance, for the entire time that Plaintiff was present in
12

1994 total but $74,450 of which the Plaintiffs share of 17.48% is only $13,013.86.
When the management fee of 5% of base rent is added, the total due for 1994 is
$14,480.53, and Plaintiff overpaid its 1994 CAM expenses by $2,951.47.
In 1995, Plaintiff paid $26,156.00 in CAM fees, yet the total CAM fees for the
shopping center were $29,613; property taxes were $55,649; and insurance was
$29,741 for a total of $115,003 of which Plaintiffs 17.48% portion was $20,102.52
plus a management fee of $2,800.60 for total expense of $22,903.12. Thus, in 1995,
Plaintiff overpaid by $3,252.88.
In 1996, Plaintiff only made three CAM payments totaling $6,537. When all
the calculations were made, Plaintiff owed Defendant but $1,915.65. Thus, Defendant
owes Plaintiff $4,188.70 for overpaid CAM fees.
Ill DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff submits that the Court should declare that the lease requires Defendant
to maintain and replace, if necessary, the HVAC units on the premises so that Plaintiff
is supplied with sufficient heating and cooling during the appropriate seasons of the
year.
IV. UNJUST ENRICHMENT
The testimony elicited indicates that Plaintiff expended considerable sums in
repairing the HVAC units after October of 1994 when defendant decided that it would
not expend additional funds in repairing the HVAC. Under the principle of quantum
meruit, defendant received the benefit of such expenditures and should be required to
13

repay Plaintiff for such. See, Paschalls. Inc. v. Dozier. 407 S.W. 2d 150 (1966);
Restatement of Restitution. §§113-117.
SUMMARY

The trial court erred in requiring Plaintiff to pay for the replacement and repair
of the HVAC when the HVAC was still under warranty and the HVAC was a fixture
which requires repair and replacement by the landlord. If the HVAC had been
repaired to the extent that it operated satisfactorily as an air conditioning and heating
unit should, that is, without the necessity of climbing up and down to the roof each
time the air conditioning needed to be turned on or off, then Plaintiff would have no
claim. But never did the HVAC work in any satisfactory manner, and the
preponderance of the evidence strongly states that defendant did not fulfill its
obligations to provide a warm, or cool, as the case may be, environment for the patrons
of Plaintiff
Defendant also overcharged for the CAM fees, and but for the instant lawsuit, it
would have continued overcharging Plaintiff for yearly CAM fees as it did in 1994 and
1995. In 1996, Plaintiff only paid three out of twelve months of CAM fees, but
because of the gross overcharges of defendant, Plaintiff owed less than a month of
standard CAM fee charges. One wonders how much money Defendant has
overcharged the other tenants of the shopping center.
The judgment should be reversed and remanded to the trial court with the
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necessity of climbing up and down to the roof each time the air conditioning needed to be
turned on or off, then Plaintiff would have no claim. But never did the HVAC work in any
satisfactory manner, and the preponderance of the evidence strongly states that defendant did
not fulfill its obligations to provide a warm, or cool, as the case may be, environment for the
patrons of Plaintiff.
Defendant also overcharged for the CAM fees, and but for the instant lawsuit, it would
have continued overcharging Plaintiff for yearly CAM fees as it did in 1994 and 1995. In
1996, Plaintiff only paid three out of twelve months of CAM fees, but because of the gross
overcharges of defendant, Plaintiff owed less than a month of standard CAM fee charges. One
wonders how much money Defendant has overcharged the other tenants of the shopping
center.
The judgment should be reversed and remanded to the trial court with the instruction
that Plaintiff is not liable for the cost of replacing or repairing the HVAC; that Plaintiff should
be paid its overcharges; and that Plaintiff should be granted its reasonable attorney's fees
incurred in prosecuting this action.
A el cil. c1": ii idum
There are no materials for the addendum.
Respectfully submitted this 13th day of August, 1998.

DEAN H. BECKER
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